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Use error is one of the leading causes of medical device incidents.
It is crucial for all stakeholders to have a unified means to better un-
derstand, classify, communicate, and prevent/avoid medical device
use errors. In this paper, we present our ongoing work on devel-
oping a new use error taxonomy for medical devices that has the
potential to enable fine-grained analysis of use errors and their root
causes in system design. Our ultimate goal is to create a generic
framework that can be used by medical device designers to better
identify effective design solutions to mitigating use errors.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Medical Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) typically incorporate a
Human-Machine Interface (HMI) that serves as a centralized or
distributed portal for users to monitor and control the system. Con-
sider for example the Integrated Clinical Environment [8] (ICE), an
interoperable infrastructure that coordinates multiple medical de-
vices, medical apps, and other equipment to accomplish a shared
clinical mission. ICE systems often provide a centralized HMI to
allow the users to monitor and control the devices connected to the
system. The HMI might also include safety interlocks and other
intelligences (e.g., a centralized smart alarm system) to facilitate
effective and safe user-system interaction.
It is thus critical to the safety of medical CPS to design safe
HMIs that ensure expected user-system interactions and prevent
potential use errors. Use error is an act of omission or commis-
sion performed by the user that causes a device to respond unex-
pectedly [7]. Preventing use errors has been long acknowledged
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as a top priority in medical device design [1, 13]. From a system
engineering standpoint, use errors are often induced by flaws in
the HMI design. In fact, investigations of incidents with medical
devices usually reveal that HMI design flaws, rather than the lack
of user training or inadvertent user behavior, constitute the main
source of use errors [2, 10].
To design safer HMIs that prevent use errors and facilitate the
recovery from use errors when they occur, developers need to have
a clear understanding of the relation between HMI design aspects
and use errors. A standard way to build this understanding is by
using a use error taxonomy that classifies use errors in accordance
with systematic criteria. Developers can use the taxonomy as a
reference, to check what types of use errors typically occur during
user-system interaction, as well as when the errors are likely to
occur. In addition, a use error taxonomy can also help developers
distinguish intricate differences between use errors stemming from
different causes, and in turn devise effective measures to prevent
and mitigate future use errors.
Numerous use error taxonomies have been proposed for medical
systems with different degrees of specificity, scope, and coverage
(see [17] for a survey). These taxonomies can be categorized in
two main types: model-based taxonomies, which build on human
cognitive models (an example taxonomy of this type is that pro-
posed by Zhang et al. [21]); and data-driven taxonomies, which
build on statistical data on use errors (an example taxonomy of this
type is that presented in [20] for number entry errors). In general,
model-based taxonomies promote more systematic classification of
use errors, and their applicability typically extends across multiple
device types [17].
However, existing taxonomies have a variety of limitations that
might result in incorrect, incomplete, or inaccurate classification
of use errors. On the one hand, data-driven taxonomies often in-
clude ad-hoc error categories derived from statistics on medical in-
cidents. They are usually limited to the current understanding and
knowledge about use errors with a specific system. On the other
hand, model-based taxonomies usually build on Norman’s action
theory model [3], which explains human decision-making as a se-
quential process with seven conceptual cognitive stages. Whilst
Norman’s action theory provides mental scaffolding for reasoning
about the causal relation between HMI design aspects and use er-
rors, the model over-simplifies an aspect of human cognition that
is important in the medical domain: skilled behavior due to well
practiced activities (e.g., learnt through training) or related to ac-
tions (predominantly motor actions) that can be performed with
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little conscious attention. This causes the taxonomies built on No-
man’s model to fall short when dealing with use errors committed
by trained personnel, which is often the case with clinical operators
of medical devices.
In the paper, we present a use error taxonomy for medical de-
vices that aims to address the limitations of existing taxonomies,
and explore the benefits of using a cognitive process model that
is more sophisticated than Norman’s action theory model. In par-
ticular, we consider Rasmussen’s decision-ladder framework [15],
which is also extensively used in the avionics sector to analyze use
errors committed by pilots.
Contributions. The main contributions are: (i) the development of
a use error taxonomy for medical devices to help developers reason
about use error types and their relation with HMI design; (ii) an
initial evaluation of the benefits of the developed taxonomy with
respect to existing taxonomies.
2. RELATED WORK
Various approaches have been developed in recent years to clas-
sify use errors with medical devices and better understand their
causes in system design.
In [12], Leveson’s System Theoretic Accidents Models and Pro-
cess (STAMP) framework is used as a basis to classify medical
errors. STAMP is designed to support the analysis of causal fac-
tors not only at the level of unsafe actions committed by individual
users, but also at management levels. While this broader view is
certainly useful for healthcare providers to investigate system- and
organizational-level causes of use errors, the error model used in
the framework only coarsely classifies use errors into three cate-
gories: feedback, control action, and knowledge errors.
In [14], a Human Factors Classification Framework (HFCF) [19]
from the avionics domain is adapted to the analysis of medical
device-related incidents. The framework is built on Reason’s er-
ror model [16] Similarly to the approach based on STAMP, HFCF
considers use errors from a system-level perspective, and includes
only five use error categories: decision errors, skill-based errors,
perceptual errors, routine violations, and exceptional violations.
In [5] and [4], participatory design methods were used to cre-
ate use error taxonomies for Computerized Physician Order Entry
(CPOE) and tele-medicine systems. Participatory design builds on
focus group discussions involving relevant stakeholders, including
human factors specialists, cognitive specialists, social scientists and
clinicians. The taxonomies produced in these works have short-
comings similar to those faced by data-driven taxonomies, i.e., the
classification is not systematic and focuses on a specific type of
medical systems.
3. BACKGROUND
Similarly to Norman’s actions theory model, the Decision-Ladder
framework describes human problem-solving as a seven-stage cog-
nitive process. As illustrated in Figure 1, these stages include: (i)
goal formation, where one decides what needs to be done; (ii) in-
tention formation, where one decides a strategy to achieve the se-
lected goal; (iii) actions specification, where one identifies a con-
crete sequence of actions to implement the selected strategy; (iv)
actions execution, where one performs the identified sequence of
actions; (v) perception, where one monitors the effects of the ac-
tions; (vi) interpretation, where one develops an understanding of
the perceived system state; and (vii) evaluation, where one decides
whether the goal has been achieved. Failure to complete any cog-
nitive stage is interpreted as a precursor to use error.
The advantage of the Decision-Ladder framework lies in that one
Figure 1: The Decision-Ladder Framework.
can traverse the cognitive stages in a non-sequential order, by tak-
ing certain cognitive shortcuts to skip cognitive stages. The cogni-
tive shortcuts are useful for representing “rule of thumb” solutions
adopted by experienced users when solving common problems [9,
6]. It should be noted that, when used appropriately, cognitive
shortcuts can greatly improve interaction performance and also re-
duce use errors. The Decision-Ladder model includes three types
of shortcuts:
• Skill-based shortcuts: heuristics adopted by skilled users when
performing highly practiced actions during tasks (mainly mo-
tor tasks) – skilled users can complete these tasks with little
or no feedback from the device.
• Rule-based shortcuts: heuristics adopted by trained users
when performing procedural tasks they have learned through
training or from previous experience – trained users typically
rely on waypoints to monitor progress and status of procedu-
ral tasks.
• Knowledge-based shortcuts: heuristics adopted by experi-
enced users when facing unfamiliar situations – experienced
user tends to formulate an action plan by finding an analogy
between the unfamiliar situation and some known patterns of
events, and then execute the action plan (likely using skill-
or rule-based shortcuts).
The use of cognitive shortcuts may vary across different users,
depending on the heuristics they have learned and their past expe-
rience with a particular device.
4. THE USE ERROR TAXONOMY
We follow the guidelines in [21] to develop our taxonomy:
• Step 1: Identify generic use error types by applying system-
atically a human error model to the cognitive stages of the
selected cognitive model.
• Step 2: Elaborate an interpretation of the generic use error
types with examples of the error types in the medical domain
and typical HMI design flaws contributing to them. The elab-
oration is expected to better explain how the taxonomy is ap-
plied medical devices and medical CPS.
4.1 Generic Use Errors Types
To identify generic use error types, we build on Reason’s Generic
Error Modeling System (GEMS) [16], which is a de-facto standard
approach. GEMS defines three generic error types:
• Slips - actions not carried out as intended;
• Lapses - missed actions due to temporary failure of concen-
tration, memory, or judgement;
• Mistakes - errors due to erroneous action plans.
Figure 2: Use error types in our taxonomy
Slips and Lapses are skill-based errors, while Mistakes are rule- or
knowledge-based errors.
Applying GEMS to the Decision-Ladder framework is conducted
by exploring the possibility of instantiating each error type at each
stage and shortcut of the framework. This results in 16 use errors
types (see Figure 2): 13 types of information processing errors due
to failure to complete one or more cognitive stages; and 3 types of
cognitive shortcut errors due to misuse of cognitive shortcuts dur-
ing inappropriate situations. Note that not all GEMS error types can
be applied to all stages. For example, slips or lapses are not appli-
cable to the interpretation stage, as this stage relates to knowledge-
based behaviors of the user.
We argue that the 16 identified types of use errors constitute a
fairly complete classification of use errors because: (1) the Decision-
Ladder framework covers both human decision-making activities
and the user’s expertise levels, and (2) the systematic application
of GEMS to each stage and shortcut in the Decision-Ladder frame-
work, wherever possible, enables us to cover human errors at any
point of user-system interaction.
4.2 Medical Device Use Errors Types
We tailored the generic description of the identified use error
types to the medical domain by using information from medical in-
cidents reported in the FDA’s Manufacturer and User Facility De-
vice Experience (MAUDE) database [18]. To this end, we have
analyzed 50 incident reports involving use errors in 2014 and 2015.
The rest of this section presents the identified use error types,
example medical incidents involving the error, and typical HMI de-
sign issues contributing to these error types. It is worth noting that
the HMI design issues (and examples) presented for the use error
types are not meant to be exhaustive. Instead, they provide use-
ful information for developers to better explore HMI design issues
that likely contribute to medical device use errors. For the ease of
reference, each error type is assigned with an error code.
4.2.1 Mistakes
Observation Mistake (code: OM): Failure to locate relevant feed-
back provided by the device, potentially resulting in observation or
posterior use of information that is not relevant or suitable for the
upcoming task. Typical HMI design flaws contributing to this type
of error include:
• Information overload on the HMI;
• Lack of guidance, either on the HMI or in the training mate-
rial, on how to access relevant information on the HMI.
Identification Mistake (code: IdM): Failure to identify which per-
ceived device stimuli or information resource is important for the
task being carried out. That is, the user is able to correctly perceive
feedback from the device, but fails to focus on relevant information.
Typical HMI flaws contributing to this type of error include:
• Ambiguous presentation of information on the HMI (e.g., the
device uses ‘mg’ as a shorthand for micrograms, whereas the
user is trained to read ‘mg’ as milligrams);
• Lack of guidance, either on the HMI or in the training ma-
terial, on how to identify relevant information on the HMI
(e.g., a light is blinking to indicate some problem, but the
user was unaware of the importance of that warning);
• Erroneous feedback on the HMI inducing confirmation bias
(e.g., feedback on the HMI suggests data entry is completed
when the device is still waiting for a confirmation action from
the user).
Interpretation Mistake (code: InM): Failure to assign a correct
meaning to correctly identified information, or to understand the
implications of actions. Typical HMI design flaws contributing to
this type of error include:
• Widgets on the HMI are labelled inconsistently across dif-
ferent device modes (e.g., the user is confused about how to
cancel an action, as the soft key for the Cancel action is la-
belled as “Cancel” or “Back” in different device modes);
• The HMI provides incomplete information that causes the
user to fail to understand the implications of their actions
(e.g., the HMI display reports the infusion rate value without
reporting the units during data entry).
Goal Selection Mistake (code: GSM): Failure to identify what
needs to be achieved next. Typical HMI design flaws contributing
to this type of error include:
• Information overload on the HMI (e.g., the HMI displays
guidance instruction for the current action and the next re-
quired action at the same time);
• Incomplete feedback on the HMI (e.g., feedback on the HMI
does not indicate that the device is in error condition);
• Incorrect documentation of what can be done with the device.
Task Definition Mistake (code: TDM): Failure to define a correct
strategy to achieve the selected goal. Typical HMI design flaws
contributing to this type of error include:
• The HMI does not provide appropriate functionalities neces-
sary to accomplish required tasks;
• Lack of guidance on the HMI or lack of documentation on
which device functionalities should be used to achieve a goal
(e.g., a nurse fails to stop an infusion because it is unclear
what sequence of actions should be used to stop the pump).
Formulation of Procedures Mistake (code: FPM): Failure to se-
lect the actions necessary for implementing the selected strategy.
The difference between TDM and FPM errors is that the former
are errors in deciding a strategy (e.g., adjust the dosage of the ther-
apy to be delivered) whereas the latter are errors in deciding the
actual sequence of actions (e.g., using the UP arrow key to adjust
the dosage of the therapy). Typical HMI design flaws contributing
to this type of error include:
• The HMI fails to respond to well-established user actions in a
predictable way (e.g., the data entry system silently changes
mode of operation in some boundary cases because, e.g., the
keys for increasing/decreasing the infusion parameters be-
come MR (memory recall) and MC (memory clear) functions
in certain circumstances);
• Lack of feedback on the HMI or lack of documentation about
how to address abnormal situation (e.g., error conditions).
This flaw is particularly subtle, because it may result in mis-
application of rules that are good in normal situations that are
apparently similar to the present error situation but in reality
are radically different.
Execution Mistake (code: EM): Failure to perform an action.
Typical HMI design flaws contributing to this type of error include:
• Faulty HMI interlock that assigns the wrong priority to user
actions that could be performed simultaneously (e.g., simul-
taneous presses of the ‘stop’ and ‘retract’ buttons is erro-
neously treated as ‘retract’);
• Lack of HMI interlocks that protect against dangerous ac-
tions during exploratory behavior (e.g., when the nurse is in-
vestigating ways to address an error condition);
• Lack of documentation or inappropriate HMI functions avail-
able to the user to perform required actions.
4.2.2 Slips
Observation Slips: Involuntary error occurring due to failure to
perceive device stimuli in different modalities (visual, auditory,
haptic, etc.). Typical HMI flaws contributing to this error include:
• HMI design flaws in the way information is presented (e.g.,
the size, font, and spacing of letters do not allow clear read-
ing of labels, such as in the case “VTBI19” and “VBTI9”).
• Missing feedback on the HMI (e.g., a patient records screen
does not provide sufficient information to allow unique iden-
tification of a patient, resulting in that clinicians accidentally
derive information from the wrong patient or perform actions
on the wrong patient record).
Observations slips are closely related to issues in device feedback,
and can be further divided into three sub-types based on when an
observation slip occurs in the interaction process.
Execution Verification Slips (code: OSEV). Observation slips oc-
curring after the user executes an action. This type of slip might oc-
cur because the HMI fails to provide feedback in a timely manner
when the user performs an action, or after the user has performed an
action. This design issue can lead to cascading use errors because
the user will tend to lose situational awareness about whether the
device has actually registered the performed actions.
Device Monitoring Slips (code: OSDM). Observation slips occur-
ring when the user checks the device state (e.g., failure to recognize
that the device is running out of battery because the volume of au-
dible alerts is too low to be noticeable).
Goal Evaluation Slips (code: OSGE). Observation slips occurring
when the user checks whether a goal has been achieved (e.g., failure
to understand if a therapy has been successfully started due to the
lack of salient audio-visual feedback indicating such event).
Execution Slip (code: ES). Involuntary error occurring during the
execution of an action. Typical HMI design flaws contributing to
this type of error include faulty HMI design does not take into ac-
count one or more of the following situations: natural variability
of motor actions performed by users; foreseeable accidental mo-
tor actions performed by users (e.g., the HMI erroneously wraps-
around the rate value, and the user accidentally sets the rate to max
rate rather than 0 because of an unintended additional click on the
DOWN button when the rate value is already 0); foreseeable data
entry errors (e.g., typos, number inversions, pressing of multiple
buttons at the same time).
4.2.3 Lapses
Observation Lapse (code: OL). These use errors are due to flaws
in the user’s encoding and memorization of device stimuli. They
occur mainly due to inattention, memory loss, or interference. Typ-
ical HMI design flaws contributing to this type of errors include
faulty HMI design erroneously delays feedback without the user’s
awareness.
Execution Lapse (code: EL). These use errors are related to inat-
tention, interruption, and/or intrusion into familiar patterns of ac-
tivity. Typical HMI flaws contributing to this type of error include
erroneous design of automated HMI functions that were meant to
optimize interaction with the HMI, or handle exceptional use cases
(e.g., the HMI silently discards data entry when the user pauses
data entry for a period of time).
4.2.4 Shortcut Errors
Skill-based Shortcut Errors (code: SSE): Use errors during the
execution of highly practiced tasks/actions (typically motor tasks).
Typical HMI design flaws contributing to this type of error include:
• Faulty HMI interlocks that penalize expert behavior (e.g.,
the nurse quickly presses
⇤⇥   2 ⇤⇥   2 ⇤⇥   . ⇤⇥   3 and the device erro-
neously registers “0.3” instead of 22.3 because the first two
key presses were performed too quickly and the HMI erro-
neously discards them as if they were a key debounce);
• Incorrect HMI layout for highly practiced motor actions (e.g.,
the HMI uses a numeric keypad with a phone layout in cer-
tain modes, and with a calculator layout in other modes).
Rule-based Shortcut Errors (code: RSE): Errors committed by
the user during the execution of tasks/actions based on learned rules
(heuristics). This type of error occurs when problem-solving strate-
gies normally working in standard situations fail in the present con-
text. Typical HMI flaws contributing to this type of error include:
• The HMI does not provide sufficient information to help the
user reason about the implication of applying a learned rule
in the present context (e.g., the HMI associates “slide left”
to Confirm and “slide right” to Decline, which is opposite to
typical designs, and does not provide visual cues indicating
such non-standard association);
• Feedback on the HMI fails to call the user’s attention to the
inappropriateness of certain user actions in the current con-
text (e.g., the data entry system always allows the user to
enter an infusion rate with a fractional part, but only accepts
it when the infusion rate is less than 100 mL/h. No feedback
is provided indicating such constraint, or informing the user
whether the entered rate can be accepted by the device).
Knowledge-based Shortcut Errors (code: KSE): Errors commit-
ted by the user during the execution of familiar tasks in unfamiliar
situations. This type of use error involves the adoption of an er-
roneous problem-solving strategy based on stereotyped response
to familiar systems states/modes. Typical HMI design flaws con-
tributing to this type of error include:
• The HMI provides inconsistent functionalities in conceptu-
ally similar situations;
• Feedback on the HMI is not sufficient to discriminate whether
the device is in normal operating conditions or in abnor-
mal/error states.
5. PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
We applied our taxonomy to classify a set of medical device use
errors (reported in our previous work [11]), which allowed us to
evaluate the quality of the taxonomy from two perspectives:
• Applicability: the completeness and ease of use of the tax-
onomy when applied to classify real-world use errors;
• Accuracy: the ability of the taxonomy in distinguish use er-
rors that are similar but their differences are worth highlight-
ing (e.g., because they require different mitigation strategies).
Figure 3: Classifying use errors with our Taxonomy.
Figure 4: Use error classification with Zhang et al.’s taxonomy.
5.1 Use Errors for Classification
Details of the data set of real-world use errors considered in our
exercise can be found in [11], which includes 53 use errors col-
lected from the analysis of 16 medical devices from 10 different
manufacturers, and from use-related adverse events reported in the
FDA’s MAUDE database for infusion pumps, ventilators, patient
monitors, and infant warmers in the decade 2000–2010. These use
errors and their root causes have been reviewed and confirmed by a
team of device experts and healthcare practitioners.
5.2 Applicability
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of the considered use errors in
our taxonomy (full details are available at https://goo.gl/eZAsRD).
For each use error in the dataset, except for one, we were able to
classify it to a single use error type. The only exception use error
has the following description: The user entered an incorrect key se-
quence “0 9” that was erroneously accepted and registered as “9”
without any warning. We classified this error as both Execution
Slip (ES) and Skill-based Shortcut Error (SSE), because it can be
interpreted as either an error committed while performing a motor
action, or an error committed during a routine task.
This exercise demonstrates that most use error type descriptions
in our taxonomy offer sufficient guidelines in classifying real-world
use errors, while it is possible to refine some of these descriptions
to better distinguish use error types that potentially overlap with
each other.
5.3 Classification Accuracy
We applied the taxonomy proposed by Zhang et al. [21], one of
the most comprehensive taxonomies for medical use errors to date,
to classify the same set of use errors, and compared its classifica-
tion results with ours. This allows us to compare the classification
accuracy of these two taxonomies. To ensure a correct and fair
comparison, we strictly followed the definitions of error catego-
rizes in [21] during the classification.
Figure 4 shows the classification results using Zhang et al.’s tax-
onomy. Comparison between Figures 3 and 4 indicates that use
errors distribute more evenly in our taxonomy. It is also interesting
to note that 5 out of 14 error categories in the taxonomy of Zhang
et al. did not capture any use error, as compared to just 1 out of 16
with our taxonomy. This might indicate either that our taxonomy
has a finer level of granularity that enables more accurate classifica-
tion of use errors, or that we held incorrect understanding of Zhang




































Observation Slip - Goal Evaluation
Observation Slip - Execution Verification
Table 1: Taxonomy alignment.
more comprehensive set of real-world use errors is needed to con-
firm the trend and and the reasons behind the trend. We plan it as
future work.
During the comparison of these two taxonomies, we encountered
two use errors that demonstrate the potential advantages of our tax-
onomy. As illustrated in Figure 5, two use errors were both classi-
fied as Action Specification Mistakes using the taxonomy of Zhang
et al., while our taxonomy classified these errors as different use
error types. In particular, our taxonomy classified one of these two
errors as a Rule-based Shortcut Error (see the top of Figure 5), be-
cause the error was due to the fact that the heuristic adopted by the
clinician was appropriate for similar clinical contexts but not for
the current context. The other use error (shown at the bottom of
Figure 5) was classified as an Interpretation Mistake by our taxon-
omy, because the HMI design flaw leads to a situation where the
user is not provided with complete situational knowledge nor an
understanding of the possible implications of the action.
Classifying these two use errors to different categories can help
developers better understand their root causes in HMI design and
devise more appropriate mitigation measures. For example, the first
use error can be mitigated by designing an HMI that accepts infu-
sion parameters in the same order as that used in the prescription.
The second can be mitigated by displaying the volume units next
to its value during data entry.
Alignment with Zhang et al.’s taxonomy. Table 1 presents the
alignment of our taxonomy with Zhang et al.’s. This alignment is
particularly helpful to understand the difference between these two
taxonomies, and makes it easier to compare use errors classified us-
ing one taxonomy with use error reports classified using the other.
Figure 5: Two Example Use Errors and Their Classification
6. CONCLUSION
We have presented a use error taxonomy for medical devices
with the aim to improve the understanding and awareness of all
stakeholders on medical device use errors. The preliminary evalu-
ation results of the taxonomy are promising, in that it allowed us
to better distinguish use errors reported in medical device incidents
as compared to existing taxonomies. This is critical for developers
to understand the root causes of use errors and devise appropriate
mitigation measures. Future work will concentrate on validating
the taxonomy by applying it to larger datasets, and we will explore
how to further refine the taxonomy to better distinguish similar use
errors that warrant different mitigation strategies.
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